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Consular Assistance for Foreign Defendants:
Avoiding Default and Fortifying a Defense
Amanda E. Burks*
L Imn abion
The international community has expressed extreme displeasure with the
United States's use of capital punishment. Increasingly, foreign governments,
which have been notifie of their citizen's arrest or conviction, have wanted to
become involved, especially in capital cases in which the death penaltyis sought
or has been imposed. Foreign national involvement has been Iargelyunsuccess-
ful, as it usuallycomes in the form of pleading for post-conviction relief. Often,
foreign governments participate as amicus curiae or via informal letters to the
President of the United States or the state's governor, but, recently, several
governments have brought suit in the United States Supreme Court or in the
International Courts of Justice to assert the United States's violation of Article
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention" or
"Convention").
State and federal courts have had numerous opportunities to address claims
from foreign nationals alleging that their rights to consular notification and
assistance, as provided bythe Vienna Convention, were violated. No court in the
United States has granted relief on the basis of such a violation. The hope of
inconsistencyin decisions is slight, but recent developments in both international
and American courts are somewhat encouraging.2
* J.D. Candidate, May2002, Washington and Lee University School of Lam, BA, James
Madison University, 1997; MA, University of South Carolina, 1999. The author wishes to express
her gratitude to her family and friends for their faithful support. The author would also like to
thank her felow clinicians in the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse and Professor Roger Groot.
1. SeFederal Republic of Germanyv. United States, 526 US. 111, 112 (1999) (declining
to exercise jurisdiction and enforce injunction against the Governor of Arizona to stay execution);
Paraguayv. Alen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction). See gmzery Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Dec. 24, 1969, art.
36(1), 596 US.T. 77, 262-512 (outlining consular rights for foreign nationals) (hereinafter "Vienna
Convention").
2. SeeLaGrand Case (FLG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 77,127 (une 27) (holding that the
Vienna Convention affords individual rights to foreign defendants, and a violation of the Conven-
tion rights should be appropriately remedied); John Greiner, Meim Nat/aw1 GrantdInie Stay
fExutia THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 2001, at 1A (reporting Oklahoma court's grant of
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This article tracks the claims and decisions of state, federal, and international
courts with respect to Vienna Convention violations, using as its primaryillustra-
tion the cases of Karl and Walter LaGrand? It also seeks to inform attorneys of
typical arguments and judicial responses to them, so that theymight better avoid
the pitfalls that have befallen others who have forged the field. Truly, the best
defense is an effective offense, at least with regard to this issue. The author hopes
that, in pointing out the obstacles facing a foreign national capital defendant and
her counsel, attorneys may better navigate their cases and effect just results for
their clients.
IL 71m LaGrand Case
Karl LaGrand ("Karl") and his half-brother Walter ("Walter"),4 German
nationals,5 were convicted on February 17,1984, in the Superior Court of Pima
County, Arizona, for first-degree murder, first-degree attempted murder, at-
tempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnaping.6 Each received death
sentences for the murder of bank manager Ken Harstock in a failed bank rob-
bery? Both death sentences were affirmed on appeal In a jointly-filed habeas
a stay of execution for Geraldo Valdez).
3. See nmOy State v. (Karl LaGrand, 733 P2d 1066 (Ariz. 1987); State v. (Walter)
LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1987); (Waler) LaGrand v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), wt defnk
(Karl LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 US. 1259 (1991), wt dvniA (Kar LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S.
1277 (1991), nftdmis (Walter) LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991), wt dmirA (Karl and
Walter) LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995); (Karl and Waker) LaGrand v. Lewis,
883 F. Supp. 469 PD. Ariz. 1995); (Karl and Waker) LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.
1998); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 13 (June 27).
4. The cases of Karl and Walter LaGrand illustrate each of the issues discussed in this
article. Their cases are archetypal of those involving foreign national defendants. The narrative
provides an example of how courts respond to and resolve such cases.
5. LaGrand Case (FLG. v. U.S.), 2001 ICJ. 1, 13 (une27). The International Courts
of Justice (.CJ.) found in its June 27, 2001 decision:
Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in 1962 and 1963 respec-
tively, and were German nationals. In 1967, when theywere still young children, they
moved with their mother to take up permanent residence in the United States. They
returned to Germany only once, for a period of about six months in 1974. Altougha
theylived in the United States for most of their lives, and became the adoptive children
of a United States national, they remained at all times German nationals, and never
acquired the nationalityof the United States. However, the United States has empha-
sized that both had the demeanour and speech of Americans rather than Germans, that
neither was known to have -spoken German, and that they appeared in all respects to
be native citizens of the United States.
Id
6. State v. (Karo LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066,1067 (Ariz. 1987); State v. (Walter) LaGrand, 734
P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).
7. (Wak) LaGnma 734 P.2d at 565-67. Karl and Walter entered Valley National Bank
sometine after 8.00 am. onJanuary7,1982, pointed a toygun, and demanded that Ken Harstock
("Hamtock") open the bank vaul Id at 565-66. When Harstock was unable to comply, Karl and
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petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
LaGrands argued that their constitutional rights had been violated, as they were
not advised of their rights under the Vienna Convention9 at the time of their
arrest or during their trial." They contended that they were denied access to
possible mitigation evidence that theycould have obtained from Germany." The
State of Arizona did not dispute the fact that it did not notify the LaGrands of
their rights.12 Neither defendant raised this issue at trial or in any subsequent
state appeal.13 The Nimth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the issue was proce-
durallydefaulted and the defendants' claims of actual innocence were unsubstan-
tiated.4 Karl filed a second habeas petition in the Ninth Circuit, again raising the
Vienna Convention claim."5 In the interim, Karl presented the Vienna Conven-
Walter bound and gagged Harstock and bank employee Dawn Lopez ("Lopez"). Id at 566. Walter
and Karl cooperativelystabbed Harstock twentyfour times. Id Walter also stabbed Lopez multiple
times. Id When medical personnel arrived, Harstock was dead. Id The LaGrands were arrested
later the same day. Id Karl later confessed to the crimes and claimed that he alone had stabbed
Harstock and Lopez while Walter was out of the room. Id at 566-67. He stated that he stabbed
them both with a letter opener because he panicked when Harstock kicked hin_ Id at 567. At his
trial, Walter testified that, while he did intend to rob the bank, he did not have any role in the
killings and was not present when Karl stabbed Harstock and Lo pez. Id Walter stated that when
he returned to the bank for the car keys, Karl appeared distressedand said, "I killed him. I didn't
mean to do it. I panicked. He kicked me." Id Walter called an expert psychologist to testify as
to the effects of stress on memory, specifically suggesting that Lopez did not accurately recall
Walter's being present during the stabbn, because she was in fear for her life. Id Karl did not
testify in his trial and his admissions were not admitted into evidence. Id
8. (Karl) LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991), wt dvae (Karl) LaGrand v. Arizona,
501 U.S. 1277 (1991), ntgdvvaA (Walter) LaGrand v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), ert idai
(Walter) LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991), cat dazrn
9. Vienna Convention, supa note 1, art. 36(1), 596 U.S.T. at 262-512. The Convention
rovides, under Article 36(1)(b), that, upon arrest, incarceration, or other custodial situation, a
oreign national must be advised of his right to communicate with his consulate. Id
10. (Karl and Walter) LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253,1261 (9th Cr. 1996). Neither Karl
nor Walter raised the Vienna Convention claim in their federal habeas petition to the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona. SeegmnJ# (Karl and Walter) LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.
Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995); (Karl and Walter) LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (D. Ariz. 1995).
11. (Kv ard Waw) LaGnvA 133 F.3d at 1262. The LaGrands argued that, had they been
able to contact their consulate, they could have obtained evidence of their abusive childhoods and
information on the difficulties German children of mixed marriages encounter. Id The Ninth
Grcuit stated. that this possible mitigation evidence had no bearing on eligibility for the death
penalty. Id
12. Id at 1261.
13. Id
14. Id at 1261-62. The NMth Crcuit also conduded that the LaGrands failed to show"some
objective factor external to the defense [which] impeded tounsel's efforts to complywith the State's
procedural rule," evidence of which would allow the appellate court to reach the merits of the
procedurallydefaulted claim. Id at 1261 (quoting Murrayv. Carrier, 477 US. 478,488(1986)). The
court also determined that the LaGrands did not meet the "miscarriage of justice" standard. Id at
1262.
15. (Karl) LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999).
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tion issue in state court; relief was denied on the basis of procedural default by
waiver."' Because the state court denied habeas relief and the Ninth Ctrcuit had
previously refused to grant relief, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply federal
habeas review on this issue.' The Ninth Carcuit did grant a stay of execution,
however, on the basis that the method of execution chosen, lethal gas, was
unconstitutional.8 The United States Supreme Court granted the state's applica-
tion to vacate the stay of Karl's execution and subsequently dismissed the
petition for writ of certiorari. 9 Karl LaGrand was executed on February 24,
1999.20
On March 3, 1999, Germany brought an action in the United States Su-
preme Court, moving fora preliminaryinjunction to halt the scheduled execution
of Walter LaGrand 1 Germanyclaimed as its authortyan order entered bythe
International Courts of Justice ("I.CJ") directing the United States to prevent
Walters execution, pending a final decision of the LaGrand case filed with the
I.CJ." The Supreme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, citing
"tardiness of action" on the part of Germany and "jurisdictional barriers impli-
cated bypleas."23 The Court explained that the United States had not waived its
sovereign inmunityand questioned whether Article Ill, Section 2, clause 2 of the
United States Constitution provided a basis for preventing a German citizen who
was not a consul or ambassador from being executed.24 Furthermore, the Court
stated that, with regard to the action against the state of Arizona, "a foreign
government's ability here to assert a claim against a State is without evident
support in the Vienna Convention and in probable contravention of Eleventh
16. Id The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[a] defendant shall be
precluded from [post-conviction] relief... based upon any ground... [tihat has been waived at
trial, on appeal, or in anyprevious colateralproceeding." ARIZ.R. RUM.P. 322(a)(3) (West 2001).
17. (Kad)LCaGr-n 170 F.3d at 1161.
18. (Karl) LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (9th COr. 1999) (deciding the case
without discussion of Vienna Convention claim).
19. Stewart v. (Karl) LaGrand, No. A-706, 1999 WL 92538, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1999);
Stewart v. (Kap LaGrand, 526 US. 1061 (1999).
20. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 29 (une 27).
21. FederalRepublic of Germanyv. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (decliningto
exercise jurisdiction and enforce injunction against the Governor of Arizona to stay execution).
22. 1d, s also Order Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (FR.G. v. US.),
1999 I.CJ. 1 (March 3).
23. Gwmm.% 526 US. at 112. The court noted that Germany's motion for leave to file a bill
of complaint and for a preliminary injunction was filed only two hours before the scheduled
execution Id
24. Id, stUS. CO T. a. M, 5 2, c. 2 (stating, in part, "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,




Amendment principles."" Without further explanation, the Court submitted its
decision. 6
The International Courts of Justice reached its final decision on June 27,
2001, in the case of Faond Repu ic Cemny v Unia S4W.2 7 The court's
opinion contemplated four issues: (1) whether the United States had violated
Article 36(b)(1) of the Vienna Convention in failing to advise the LaGrand
brothers of their consular rights; (2) whether the United States's doctrine of
procedural default as applied in the LaGrand case violated the obligation to
conform to the Convention; (3) whether the United States failed to complywith
the I.CJ.'s March 3, 1999, order, requiring that it employ "all measures at its
disposal" to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand, pending the final decision
of the I.CJ.;2 and (4) whether the United States appropriately remedied the
Convention violation.' As to the first issue, whether the United States violated
the Convention, the I.CJ. determined that both Karl and Walter LaGrand were
German nationals and that the United States violated Article 36(1)(b) by failing
to notify the LaGrands of their consular rights20  The LCJ. recognized the
undisputed fact that neither LaGrand brother received notification of his rights
under the Convention at the time of his arrest, conviction, or sentencing. 1
Arizona authorities claimed not to have known of the LaGrands' national status
until late-1984, "and possibly bymid-1983 or earlier, but in anyevent not at the
time of their arrest in 1982."" The United States also argued that anyone who
knew of their German citizenship prior to or at the time of their arrest was not
a "competent authority," as dictated in the Vienna Convention.33 Furthermore,
the United States argued, the LaGrands likely did not themselves know of their
German citizenship, as neither LaGrand identified himself as a German
25. Ganwi. 526 US. at 112;saUS.Co T. anmend X (stating, "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States byGtizens of another State, or byGtizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State").
26. G mm). 526 U.S. at 112.
27. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. I1 (June 27).
28. SeeOrder. Request forthe Indication o ProvisionalMeasures (FR.G. v. US.), 1999 I.CJ.
I1 (Mach 3).
29. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1 1, 1 11 (June 27).
30. Id 11 13,78.
31. Id 115.
32. Id 1 16.
33. Id; see Vienna Convention, s"tms note 1, art. 36(1)(b) (stating, '[If the foreign national]
so requests, the competent authorities of the rece*ii Stare shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular disurct a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner").
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national. 14 Regardless, the United States stipulated in its Counter-Memorial
submitted to the I.CJ. that the United States breached its obligation to Germany
under Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention." The I.CJ. agreed.36 It further
decided that the Convention creates iitucW rights due to foreign nationals and
does not merely provide for the rights of the sending State37 and its consuls."
As to the second issue, the I.CJ. concluded that, although the procedural
default rule is not a per se violation of Convention rights, its application in the
LaGrand case violated Convention Article 36(2), which requires that participating
states give "full effect" to the rights conferred under the Convention.3 The
I.CJ. recognized that United States federal courts reviewed the LaGrands' coun-
sels'professional competence, but the procedural default rule "prevented [United
States courts] from attaching anylegal significance" to the fact that the Conven-
tion violation prevented Germany from providing legal assistance.'
Because the United States "failed to take all the steps theycould have taken
to give effect to the [I.CJ.'s Order of March 3, 1999]," the I.CJ. found the
United States in violation of its order to prevent the execution of Walter
LaGrand." The I.CJ. directed the United States to adhere to two provisions:
(1) to take "all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not
executed;" and (2) to transmit the order to the Governor of Arizona.42 Accord-
ing to a letter dated March 8, 1999, from the Legal Counsellor [sic] of the United
States Embassy at The Hague, the State Department forwarded the I.CJ. order
to the Arizona Governor. 3 The State Department explained, however, that "[i]n
view of the extremely late hour of the receipt of the Court's Order, no further
steps were feasible."" The I.C.J. held that, while the United States did comply
with the second provisional measure, the "mere transmission of its [the I.CJ.'s]
Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly without
even so much as a plea for a temporarystay... was certainlyless than could have
34. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 16 (June 27). Walter affirmativelystated
his United States citizenship. Id
35. Id 11.
36. Id 123.
37. A "sending State" refers to the foreign national's country of citizensip, i.e., Germany;
a "receiving State" is the country in which the national is visiting or residing, i.e., the United States.
38. Id 77.
39. Id 90-91; s&Vienna Convention, s"ira note 1, art. 36(2) (stating, "The rights referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are in-
tended").







been done even in the short time available."4 The United States, therefore, failed
to comply with the I.C.J.'s Order of March 3, 1999.
Finally, Germanyasked the I.CJ. to determine a remedial course of action.
Specifically, Germany requested that the United States make assurances that it
will take steps to prevent further breaches of the Convention and that it will
"provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by
violation of the rights under Article 36.""s The I.CJ. recognized the apology
from the United States49 and acknowledged its efforts to educate law enforce-
ment of the rights provided by the Convention. s° The Court took note of the
United States's assurances, but stated that the United States had an obligation
under certain circumstances to review convictions and sentences." It left the
manner of implementing the process of review to the United States. 2
IlM 7he Vien Qnenim Versu the C& stiitutiw
The LaGrand brothers based their appeals on the violation of their consular
rights under the Vienna Convention. 3 The Convention is binding between its
signatories and confers reciprocal rights to its participating states and, arguably,
to their citizens.' The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Decem-
ber 24, 1969, thereby incorporating its substantive and procedural requirements
into American jurisprudence." Theoretically, its status as a binding international
treaty requires that American courts give it the same force and effect as the
45. Id1112.
46. Id 115.
47. Id 11 117, 118, 120.
48. Id 1117.
49. Id 11121-23. The United States's Counter-Memorial contained an apologyto Germany
and an assurance that the United States would talke "substantial measures aimed at preventing any
recurrence." Id
50. Id 1 121. The United States pointed out that the State Department had ublished a
booklet entitled, 'Consular Notification and Access: Instruction for Federal, State andLocal Law
Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights
of Consular Officials to Assist Them." Id It also prepared a small reference card designed to be
carried bylaw enforcement officers with information on rights under the Convention. Id
51. Id 1125.
52. Id
53. Seegeully (Karl and Walter) LaGand v. Stewart, 133 F3d 1253 (9th CAr. 1996); (Karl
and Walter) LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995); (Karl and Waker) LaGrand v.
Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (D. Ariz. 1995).
54. Vienna Convention on the Lawof Treaties, March21,1986, art. 26 (stating that "[e)very
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
55. Vienna Convention, sra note 1, art. 36 (1)(a).
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"supreme [law of the [1]and." s6 American courts, however, have construed its
authority to be somewhat limited. 7
Despite the United States judiciary's difficultydefining the Vienna Conven-
tion's authority in relation to its own, the Convention's language claims ultimate
authority in Article 36, while allowing signatory States to decide the manner of
implementation."8 The Convention states in Article 36(2):
The rights referred to in paragraph I" of this Article shall be exercised
in contformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subj; to thepn o, however, that the said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for wfhich the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.'
In the LaGrand case, the United States argued before the I.CJ. that this Article
section referred to the rights of the sending State, rather than to the individual.6 '
Additionally, the United States argued that "[i]f there is no obligation under the
Convention to create such individual remedies in criminal proceedings, the rule
of procedural default... cannot violate the Convention."' The I.CJ. made note
of the Solicitor-General of the United States's position with regard to the I.CJ.'s
order for provisional measures: "an order of the International Court of Justice
indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for
judicial relief."63 Through its arguments and executive decisions, the United
States evidenced disregard for not onlythe Vienna Convention's protections, but
also the authority of the International Courts of Justice.
56. US. CONST. art. VI, c. 2 (mandating that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, and Anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrarynotwithstanding"); seealso U. S. ODST. art. H, S 2, c. 2 (giving the President of the United
States power, with advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties).
57. Se FVmU/!y Breard v. Greene, 523 US. 371 (1998) (deciding that forum state's rules
determine implementation of international treatyand a conflicting statute in the forum state renders
treatynuIA; Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Car. 1997) (holding that violation of Vienna
Convention claim does not involve the denial of a constitutional right).
58. Vienna Convention, su"' note 1, art. 36(2).
59. Paragraph 1 describes the right of consular assistance and notification afforded foreign
nationals and consular rights of access and communication. Vienna Convention, sup note 1, art.
36(1). See bfiSm Part IV for a reproduction of Article 36(1).
60. Vienna Convention, supr note 1, ar. 36(2) (emphasis added).
61. LaGrand Case (FER.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 11 85-87 (June 27). The United States
argued that Article 36(2) provided rights to the sending State, such as "those addressing the timing
of communications, visiting hours, and security in a detention facility." Id 1 86. In other words,
because Article 36(1) conferred rights to the sending State and its consulate, not individual rights,
the United States would be giving "full effect" to the Convention byallowing the foreign consulate
access to the foreign defendant Id The I.CJ. rejected this argument as proceeding on a misreading





The case of Angel Breard ("Breard") forecast the arguments and obstacles
of the LaGrad case.64 Originating in Virginia courts, Breard's federal habeas
applications failed to provide relief for the violation of his Vienna Convention
rights, in part, because of courts' interpretation of the authority (or lack thereof)
of the Convention." Although the majorityin Bnwadv Pni& did not discuss the
relationship between the Vienna Convention and the ConstitutionJudge Butzner
wrote in his concurrence:
The provisions of the Vienna Convention have the dignityof an act of
Congress and are binding upon the states. The Supremacy Clause
mandates that rights conferried by a treaty be honored by the states.
... The importance of the Vienna Convention cannot be overstated.
It should be honored by all nations that have signed the treaty and all
states of this nation."
In denying Breard's petition for habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court
rejected Breard's contention that the Convention "trumps" the United States's
procedural laws. It further stated that the Vienna Convention explicitlyprovides
that the rights expressed in the Convention shall be enforced by the receiving
State's laws. 67 The Court determined that, since Breard "failed to exercise his
rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of the United
States and the Commonwealth of Virginia," he could receive no relief under the
auspices of the Convention." The Court acknowledged its obligation to give
"full effect" to the provisions of the Convention and its "respectful consideration
to the interpretation of an international treatyrendered by an international court
with jurisdiction to interpret such," but made no finding as to whether its
decision fulfilled that duty.69 The Court also justified its decision bystating that
"although treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the
64. Saw4n/yBreard v. Pruett, 134 F3d 615 (4th ar. 1998) (refusing to hear petitioner's
Vienna Convention claim, because it was not raised in state proceedings); Paraguay v. Allen, 134
F.3d 622 (4th CGr. 1998) (holding that Paraguay failed to prove two prongs of Ex pae Youn
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Bvd, 523 US. at 371 (deciding that forum state's
rules determine implementation of international treaty and a conflicting statute in the forum state
renders treaty null).
65. Breard failed to raise the Vienna Convention claim in state proceedings. See Breard v.
Commonwealth, 445 S.E2d 670 (Va. 1994) (deciding on other issues); Breard v. Virginia, 513 US.
971 (1994), awt kiia4 Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (ED. Va. 1996) (dismissing
petition for habeas relief on ground of procedural default); Bmmn, 134 F.3d at 617 (affirming district
court's dismissal of federal habeas petition); Para 134 F.3d at 625 (stating, At no point in his
direct appeal did Breard allege that the Commonwealth had violated anytreatyprovision during the
riod of his detention and trial .... In his state court petition [for habeas corpus] Bread again
failed to allege violations of any treaty").
66. Bmvd 134 F.3d at 622 (Butzner, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
67. Bn=m 523 US. at 375-76.
68. Id
69. Id at 375.
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land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself."'0 Fur-
thermore, the Court rested its decision on the principle "that an Act of Congress
... is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent
in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders
the treaty null."' In this case, Breard could only seek relief for Convention
violations subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPAf).2 AEDPA barred him from such relief.73 Breard was executed, on
schedule, on April 14, 1998.' 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit also refused to
give equal consideration to the Constitution and Coivention in its decision in
Murphyv Nlm-darl The court nominallyacknowledged that "[a]lthough states
mayhave an obligation under the Supremacy Clause to comply with the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention, the Supremacy Clause does not convert viola-
tions of treaty provisions.. . into violations of can'tiuti rights." 6 Because
Murphy could not demonstrate a "substantial showing of the denial of a =tit*
tiwnl right,"' specifically, the Fourth Carcuit determined that the Convention
issue was not appealable."
IV. Inirmd Ris Vesm Ris qthe Smring State4and Its Cmd
One of the major issues in cases addressing Vienna Convention violations
is whether the Convention establishes individual rights or rights for the sending
State and its consul. The language of the Convention creates some ambiguity.
The Preamble states that the "purpose of such [consular] privileges and immuni-
ties is na to bm* ipzd but to ensure the efficient gerformance of functions
byconsular posts on behalf of their respective States." The Preamble seems to
70. Id at 376.
71. Id (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 Us. 1, 18 (1957)).
72. Id;seeAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenalyAct, Pub. L No. 104-132,§ 104, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codifed as amended at 28 US.C S 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. V. 1999)).
73. Bmvzr 523 U.S. at 376-77.
74. Governor Gilmore refused to delaythe execution, despite an order fromthe I.CJ. to stay
Breand's execution. S Brooke A. Masters & Joan Bisimpic, Mr Exautea D pite Pim" Wrdd
T"rilva StateDepmaWr HadUgdDda WASH. POST, April 15,1998, at BO. Paraguayfiled suit
in the LCJ. on April 3, 1998, and the Court ordered the United States to take all measures at its
disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings, [sic] and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken i plemen-
tation of this Order." Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relatios (Para. v.
US.), 1998 LCJ. 1, 41 (April 9).
75. Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99-100 (4th Cr. 1997) (holding that defendant's
Vienna Convention claim was procedurally defaulted).
76. Id at 100.
77. Id at99 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 US.C S 2253(c)(2) (1996)).
78. Id at 100.
79. Vienna Convention, s"~im note 1, Preamble (emphasis added).
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indicate that the Convention does not create an individual right for an alien or
foreign national. Article 36(1) of the Convention, however, states, in part:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending State:
a. [Consular officials shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending State and to have access to them. Nazicwls c9ftesmState shafl howe dx~ sar 6rmtm with ea to amsaidain ruth r
to, ,a gre lgtate
b. [1fLe so . t the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
anyother manner. Anycommnicauon addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
also be forvaded by the said authorities without delay. 7e said
am~onxzis shill v#&mnanw mvi iw ddfay 'hi n& wier
c. [qonslar officials shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with hiin and to arrange for his legal representa-
tion.80
The language of this article, especially in (1)(a) and (b), suggests that, distinct
from the consulate representative's rights of visitation and communication, the
foreign national has the right to communicate with his consulate."1 In fact, the
receiving State has an obligation to inform the individual of that right "without
delay."82 Furthermore, if a defendant or suspect exercises her right and requests
consular contact and assistance, the request must be forwarded to the designated
consulate.83 The plain language seems to make the individual right evident, but
American decisions have concluded otherwise.
American courts have typically construed Article 36 as creating a consular
right. The I.CJ. explicitly decided that the Convention bestows individual
rights." Again, the United States and the I.CJ. conflict. In LaGrad, the United
States took the position that
the rights of consular notification and access under the Vienna Con-
vention are rights of States, and not of individuals, even though these
rights may benefit individuals by permitting States to offer them
consular assistance. [The United States] maintains that the treatment
due to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked to and
80. Id at art. 36(1) (emphasis added).
81. Id at art. 36(1)(a).
82. Id at art. 36(1)(b).
83. Id
84. LaGrand Case (FY.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 77 (June 27).
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derived from the right of the State, acting through its consular officer,
to communicate with its nationals, and does not constitute a funda-
mental right or a human right."s
The I.CJ., however, concluded that the plain text of the Convention creates
individual rights that maybe invoked bythe national's sending State or the I.CJ.
itself.8 6 The I.CJ.'s decision is a very recent one, and its impact has yet to be
seen reflected in American decisions. Given the United States's pattern of
international isolation and self-insulation on the issues surrounding the capital
penalty, however, the effect may prove minimal.
In a recent non-capital Virginia case, Sh/i&fo v Cwmrmaltb,"7 the
defendant argued on appeal that his statement should be excluded, in part, on the
basis of violations of the Vienna Convention and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."8 The Supreme Court of Virginia cited Kai v Cwmw
tdaj,89 which held that the Vienna Convention does not create legally enforce-
able individual rights.' On that basis, the court concluded that "[Shackleford's]
purported right to speak with an official of the Jamaican Embassy did not violate
the Vienna Convention or any rights secured to him by the Constitution of the
United States."" Because no violation occurred, the court did not further discuss
remedies. The court also did not address the alleged due process violation.
The Shb&/faddecision is typical of how American courts traditionallyview
the effect of international treaties. Although it did not decide whether the
Convention provided individual rights, the court in Rodiu v Sta characterized
the treaty's significance as an acknowledgment between sovereigns.' The Rodi
court cited the Federalist Papers, which state that "[treaties] are not rules pre-
85. Id 76.
86. Id. 77.
87. 547 S.E2d 899 (Va. 2001).
88. Shaldeford v. Comnonweakh, 547 S.E.2d 899,905 (Va. 2001). Shackleford also argued
that he was improperly advised of his Miranda righits and that he was illegally detained because the
officers lacld reasonable suspicion on which to hold him. Id
89. 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).
90. S/Ax&qbn4 547 S.E.2d at 905; seeKasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 2001)
(holding that the Convention does not create individual rights; suppression of defendant's confes-
sion was not appropriate).
91. Sh*kfq* 547 SXE2d at 906.
92. 16 S.W3d 1 (Tex. Cairn. App. 2000).
93. See Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. CAim. App. 2000) (holding that Vienna
Convention does not create individual rights; remedies are political in nature). In discussing Unuid
Statz v L, hovever, the Rdas court did include a statement issued by the State Department in L i
stating that the Vienna Convention and U.S.- China bilateral consular convention"establish state-to-
state rights and obligations ... [however] [t]hey are not treaties establishing rights of individuals."
Id at 18 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Or. 2000)).
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scribed bythe sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and
sovereign."" The timbre of the Rodau court's opinion follows this principle.
Lately, however, the Southern District Court of New York determined in
Start v City Cf New York" that, because the Convention confers an individual
right, a German national had standing to bring a 42 U.S.C S 1983 action for
violation of Vienna Convention rights. The district court first determined that
the Vienna Convention is a self-executing treaty, which suggests that "it provides
rights to individuals rather than merely setting out the obligations of signato-
ries.""' The court next examined the plain language of the Convention."8 It cited
case law that stated that the "language of Article 36 clearly refers to the existence
of an individual right,"" and the language in the Preamble"° refers to individuals
in their consular capacity; "rather than civilian foreign nationals.""'1 The court
then looked to the treaty equivalent of legislative history and found that it
evidenced concern for the protection of individual rights.1°2 The fact that other
countries have recognized the individual protections in the Convention and have
argued the point in their amicus briefs, filed on behalf of foreign criminal defen-
dants in the United States, also factored into the court's decision. Finally, the
district court noted that the United States invokes the Convention on behalf of
94. Rodia, 16 S.W.3d at 15 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton))
(emphasis omitted).
95. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
%. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the
Vienna Convention creates a personalright and defendant, therefore, had standing to bring aS 1983
action).
97. Stan, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 423 n.3 (quoting Bn=4 134 F.3d at 622 (But=ner, J. concur-
ring)).
98. l at 424 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26);
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 US. 176, 180 (1982) (stating "Interpretation of
[the Treaty] must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself L and] [tihe clear import
of Treaty language controls"); see also Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Gr. 2000).
99. Stwai 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (quoting United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d
74,77 (D. Mass. 1999)).
100. "The purpose of such privileges and immunities (set forth herein] is not to benefit
individuals, but to ensure the efficient performance of functions byconsular posts on behalf of their
respective States." Id; sealso Vienna Convention, s"tmz note 1, Preamble.
101. Stan*, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425; seeao United States v. Rodrigues,68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating, "[I]t appears that the purpose of [the Preamble] is not to restrict the
individual notification ights of foreign nationals, but to make dear that the Convention's purpose
is to ensure the smooth functioning of consular posts in general, not to provide special treatment
for individual consular officials").
102. Stand, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425- 26. The court particularlynoted the position of the United
States in the committee meetings, in which representatives of the United States proposed language
to "protect the rights of the national concerned." Id at 426 (quot UnitaiNaims QC 6m on
CbadauRdardc: Of.ficial Records, No. 63.X2 at 337, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 2 (1963)).
103. Stan, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (citing Bread v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va.
1996)); Federal Republic of Germanyv. United States, 526 US. 111 (1999)).
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American citizens detained abroad who have been denied their consular rights,
and reciprocity demands that the United States recognize the Convention's
protection of foreign nationals within its borders."° The court's conclusion was
that the "Vienna Convention was intended to provide a private right of action to
individuals detained by foreign officials."'
V. 7he E lwnh A nmrdnt and Zbe Young Exepati
In its short opinion in Fad/ Reub qC GeimMy v Unie/Sta ," the
Supreme Court made reference to possible Eleventh Amendment issues that
would call into question a foreign government's ability to bring suit against a
State10 The Court did not elaborate. Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth
Orcuit, however, discussed the Eleventh Amendment implications in their
opinions in Angel Breard's case."'
In Paraguay v A //en °9 the Fourth Circuit based its holding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case solely on Eleventh Amendment
pinciples." ° That court referenced the sovereign immunitystates enjoybecause
of the Amendment's limitation on federal judicial power over particular actions
"against unconsenting states of the Union.""' Although the immunity literally
covers actions brought by "Citizens of another state or by Ctizens or Subjects
of any foreign State," case law has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to
restrict actions by foreign states."' Sovereign immunity also extends to actions
against state officials, particularly named in a suit, when those actions are, in
actuality, against the state as the real party in interest."' A party bringing an
action may come under proper jurisdiction, however, only if it proves the two
104. Id at 427.
105. Id
106. 526 Us. 111 (1999).
107. Federal Republic of Germanyv. United States, 526 US. 111,112 (1999) (holding that the
Court could not entertain the suit, because the State of Arizona had not waived its sovereign
immunity and because of "the probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles").
108. Se Breard v. Greene, 523 US. 371, 377-78 (1998) (deciding that failure to alert Para-
guayan consulate did not constitute "continuing consequences of past violation of federal rights"
in the absence of an exception, the state is imne from foreign suits (citing M llenv. Bradley, 433
US. 267 (1977))); Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626-29 (4th Gr. 1998) (holding that Vienna
Convention violation did not meet Ex poet Yw exception to overcome Eleventh Amendment);
swaso US. Con. amend M (stating that *the Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State*).
109. 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cr. 1998).
110. See Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 (4th Gr. 1998).
111. Id at 627 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US. 89,98 (1984)).




prongs stated in Ex pate Ycwr' 14  (1) the violation about which the party
complains is ongoing; and (2) the relief sought is prospective only."i Paraguay
failed under both prongs. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the federal district
court that the violation of Paraguay's treaty rights was not ongoing, because it
was notified of Breard's situation, as of the time of the district court opinion, and
was not prevented from providing aid.116 Furthermore, any action the Fourth
Circuit could theoretically take at that point would not remedy the violation
against Breard. The fact that Paraguay was seeking injunctive relief - vacation
of the conviction and death sentence - did not alter the essence of the request,
which is "quintessentially retrospective."117
VI. Pmar Diiaukt
Procedural default often proves problematic for appellate attorneys. The
Convention requires that state authorities advise foreign defendants of their
consular rights, but in the wake of rampant failure on the part of police, prosecu-
tom, and other state officials to comply, prudent defense attorneys would be wise
to "conventionalize" everyclient. Defense attorneys should ask every defendant
they represent if he is a citizen of the United States. If the defendant is a foreign
national, he has consular assistance rights that American defendants, obviously,
do not. If he did not receive those rights at the time of arrest or while in cus-
tody, his Vienna Convention rights have been violated. Defense attorneys must
raise this issue at trial or face the rigors of raising it on appellate review or in a
habeas petition. If the issue is defaulted, the defendant must show both cause
and prejudice to permit the habeas court to entertain the issue.
Neither Karl nor Walter LaGrand raised the Convention issue in state
proceedings, and, as a result, the Ninth Circuit twice rejected their claims on the
basis of procedural default.' " The I.CJ. addressed the adverse effect of the
procedural default rule and concluded that its application in the LaGrand case
prevented adequate review of issues in those cases.119
114. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
115. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1908) (holding that federal courts mayexerdse
jurisdiction over state officials in cases brought by parties suffering from violations of federally
protected rights if the violation is ongoing and the relief sought is prospective); se aso Green v.
Mansour, 474 US. 64, 68 (1985) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not allow federal
courts to order "notice relief" against states, because it is not the appropriate remedy for ongoing
violations of federal law).
116. Af/e 134 F_3d at 627.
117. Id at 628.
118. (Karl LaGrand and (Walter) LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253,1261-62 (9th ar. 1998)
(stating that defendant must show cause and actual prejudice to overcome procedural default);
(Kar LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F3d 1158, 1161 (9th CAr. 1999) (finding federal habeas review not
available on this claim unless the defendant can show cause for his default and actual prejudice).
119. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 91 (June 27).
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The United States Supreme Court followed both the federal district and
circuit courts in refusing to hear Angel Breard's Convention violation argument,
because he, too, failed to raise the issue in state court.' Breard, and Paraguay
in its own suit, argued that the Convention was the "supreme law of the land"
and, as such, superceded the procedural default doctrine.' The Supreme Court
rejected Breard's argument for two reasons: (1) the principle that the State's
procedural rules are the manner in which the treaty is implemented and, there-
fore, prevail in conflict with a treaty, and (2) the pertinent procedural default rule
was enacted in 1994 as part of AEDPA,"' and, as the act of Congress most
recentlyenacted, it controls.123 Without an evidentiaryhearing, which is prohib-
ited byAEDPA in cases where a defendant failed to raise the issue in state court,
Breard would be unable to present evidence of the Paraguayan consulate's
potential contribution to his defense or demonstrate the novelty of his claim.
124
In Murphy v N&x, ' 2 s the Fourth Crcuit precluded review of Murphy's
Vienna Convention violation claim, as it was procedurally defaulted in state
court.126 Because of his default, he was precluded from making the argument on
appeal 2 Furthermore, Murphycould not establish cause or prejudice for failing
to argue the issue in state proceedings.' Regarding the "cause" prong, the
Fourth Circuit stated that a reasonably dlient attorney would have discovered
the applicabilityof the Vienna Convention.129 In fact, the court listed other cases
in which attorneys had made such arguments in state court. " ' The court could
120. Breard v. Greene, 523 US. 371,375 (1998).
121. Id
122. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L No. 104-132, S 104, 110 StarL
1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C S 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. V. 1999)) (stating
that, in general, a federal court will not afford a federal habeas petitioner an evidentiay hearing for
an issue hehas failed to develop the factual basis of... in State court proceedings"). Sw aho
Bn nm 523 US. at 376.
123. B=m4 523 US. at 375-76.
124. Id at 376; seegeoufy Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288 (1989) (holding that a defendant is
barred from raising a factual claim not previously made in state court, unless the claim relies on a
new, retroactive constitutional rule of law, or the "new" facts could not have been previouslyfound
by exercise of due diligence, and but for the evidence the defendant would not have been con-
icted).
125. 116 F.3d 97 (4th CAr. 1997).
126. See Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F3d 97, 100 (4th (Jr. 1997) (holding that violation of
Vienna Convention rights did not involve constitutional rights; claim procedurally barred).
Defendant was convicted in the Crcuit Couit of the City of Virginia Beach for capital murder for
hire and conspiracyto commit capitalmurder. Id at 99. He received a death sentence. Id Murphy
was executed on September 17,1997. Ellen Nakashima MeximCiuizmExeationin V De-pitePlew
firm Gowmerv WASH. PCST, Sept. 18,1997, at D4.
127. Mur) 166 F3d at 99-100. The federal district court had previously also rejected
consideration of the Convention issue on procedural default grounds. Id at 99.
128. Id at 100.
129. Id
130. Id; see Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th CJr. 1996); Waldron v. INS., 17 F.3d
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reason no other impediment to making the claim appropriately."' The court also
would not recognize prejudice from the fact that the Mexican consulate was not
contacted in tme. Specifically, the court did not agree with Murphy that the
consulate representative's involvement would have caused him to change his plea
to guilty or resulted in Murphy's presenting mitigation evidence not otherwise
available.0
3
The courts in Bran and Murpy perhaps underestimated the value of
consular assistance to a defense. The Supreme Court in Bmmd suggested that
American attorneys were better suited to handle matters in United States courts
than a consular attorney, in that they knew the system and the laws of the
jurisdiction better."' The Court ignored potential problems inherent with an
American attorney that would not be the case when a consular attorney repre-
sented or, at least, participated in the defense; these include: (1) language barri-
ers; (2) the American attorney's failure to understand cultural customs; (3) her
failure to gain access to mitigation evidence without assistance from the consulate
investigators; and (4) her failure to recognize infornmation as mitigating given the
cultural or regional practices of a particular nation.
VII. The Pmrim, jfRerr4
The remedy for a Convention violation, as argued by the United States in
LaGrarg is an apology and an assurance that it will make efforts to prevent
further violations. 3 The I.CJ. has proved helpless to enforce its orders in
decisions like that of the LaGrandcase. As discussed above, the I.QJ. found the
United States in violation of its express order to exercise every possible means
within its authorityto halt Walter LaGrand's execution, pending the I.QJ.'s final
decision. Its recourse was to "take note" of the United States's apology to
Germanyand promise to take preventive action, so that anyfurther Convention
violations would receive effective reviewin the appellate process." The inherent
problem with remedyfor the I.CJ. in that case, as of the date of its final opinion,
was the fact that both LaGrand brothers had been executed. United States state
and federal court opinions have not dictated a clear remedy to Convention
511, 518 (2nd ar. 1993); United States v. RangelGonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th CAr. 1980);
United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th CGr. 1979); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611
F.2d 751, 752 (9th Gr. 1979).
131. Mu#, 166 F.3d at 100.
132. Id at 100-01.
133. Id
134. Bred, 523 US. at 377.
135. LaGrand Case (FY.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1, 119, 123 (June 27).
136. Id 127. The I.CJ. stated, "the Court will therefore limit itself to taking note of the
commitment undertaken by the United States to ensure implementation of the specific measures




violations or have simplyrefused to grant any. The United States Supreme Court
decided in Bradv Gw& that, in response to Paraguay's petition to vacate the
conviction and sentence against Breard, "neither the text nor the history of the
Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in
United States courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation
of consular notification provisions.""' The court in Paraguay v A led39 similarly
stated that it could not grant an injunction to vacate Breard's death sentence.1O
In Roa v State' 1 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
appropriateness of excluding evidence obtained before advising Rocha of his
consular rights.'42 Rocha was interviewed bya homicide detective in connection
with the case, and Rocha's oral statements were admitted as evidence against him
at triaL1 43 Rocha contended in his appeal that he was not notified of his Conven-
tion rights to consular assistance.1  The state did not dispute that it had not so
advised Rocha."' The court referenced Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which states:
No evidence obtained byan officer or other person in violation of any
provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the
Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.46
The appellate court distinguished the "laws" of Article 38.23 and the "law,"
which includes constitutions and treaties, such as the Vienna Convention.141
Article 3823, then, lists only"laws," statutes promulgated bythe legislature, and
the Texas and United States constitutions as bases for applying the exclusionary
rule.14 Article 38.23 does not, therefore, include violation of a treaty as the basis
137. 523 US. 371 (1998).
138. Breard v. Greene, 523 US. 371, 377 (1998).
139. 134 F.3d 622 (1998).
140. Paraguayv. Alien, 134 F3d 622, 629 (1998).
141. 16 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
142. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 13-19 (Tex. Cain. App. 2000). Felix Rocha was convicted
of capital murder in the commission of a robberyin November 1998. Id at 4. Sako Maldonado
v. State, 998 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Cai. App. 1999) (codefendant's case; holding that, because the
defendant failed to show affirmatively that he was a citizen of Mexico, he was not entitled to
notification of his consular rights).
143. Rook, 16 S.W3d at 11, 13. In a pretrial motion to suppress his statements, Rocha
testified that he was a Mexican citizen d The detective who interviewed him also testified that
Rocha told him before taking his statement that he was Mexican. Id The detective further testified
that Rocha's primarylanguage is Spanish; he cannot speak English. Id
144. Id at 13.
145. Id
146. Id; sahoTEX. GODE CRML P. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1999).




for excluding illegally obtained evidence.149 As authority for its decision, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also relied on two cases - UnitStats v La 50
and UnitedStam v Lcwvr, Cranvmidi - that held that exclusion of evidence is
inappropriate for a Vienna Convention violation.152 UniwidStat v Li stated that
treatyviolations are remedied bypolitical negotiation: "it is obvious that with all
this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress."'53 The
Lr um-.Cawdir and Li decisions also considered a State Department state-
ment - "no other signatories to the Vienna Convention have permitted suppres-
sion under similar circumstances, and... two (Italy and Australia) have specifi-
callyrejected it" - before ruling against exclusion of the evidence." 4 InRodAthe
Texas Court of Crminal App ultimately concluded that Article 38.23, as a
state statute, was not an appropriate authority for enforcing international agree-
ments.155 The court did, however, acknowledge that, if the United States Su-
preme Court decided to require states to adhere to a federal exclusionary rule, it
must comply.6
The decision in Star ' C& ity qfNew York, s however, indicates that Ameri-
can courts may be more responsive to requests for remedy. The court, deciding
that a plaintiff could recover damages for violation of a Vienna Convention right
in a S 1983 action, denied the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment. s8 The
court specifically distinguished civil damages from remedies in a criminal case
and stated that damages for unlawful detention are "much less 'drastic' than
suppressing incriminatory evidence or dismissing an indictment against a prop-
erly charged criminal defendant."5 9 The court seemed to consider itself on safe
ground in a civil context, and, while it differentiated between civil and criminal
149. Id at 14-17.
150. 206 F3d 56 (1st COr. 2000).
151. 206 F3d 882 (9th Cr. 2000) (en basc).
152. Rod, 16 S.W.3d at 16-18. SeeUnied States v. Li, 206 F3d 56 (1st Or. 2000) (holding
that suppressing evidence is not the appropriate remedyfor a Vienna Convention violation); United
States v. Lombera-Camodinga, 206 F3d 882 (9th Cr. 2000) (same).
153. Li, 206 F.3d at 60-61 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 US. 580, 598 (1884)); see aso
Lonmbieu-GmrW 206 F3d at 887 (stating that "[t]he State Department indicates that it has
historicallyenforced the Vienna Convention itself, investigating reports of violations and apologiz-
ing to foreign governments and working with domestic law enforcement to prevent future viola-
tions when necessary").
154. L wrb GnGm i 206 F.3d at 888; seeabo L, 206 F.3d at 64-66.
155. Rwxb,, 16 S.W~d at 19; se also Zapata v. State, 15 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Co App. 2000)
(following Rodm in refusing to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention);
Trujillo v. State, 25 S.W. 270 (Te. Cot App. 2000) (same).
156. Roda, 16 S.W.3d at 19.
157. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (2001).
158. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417,431 (2001).
159. Id at 429.
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remedies, it did not suggest that a remedy in a criminal case would be inconceiv-
able.
VIII. Usnhe CorulateinaDqfme
The German consulate assisted the LaGrand attorneys on a diplomatic level,
once they were notified of Karl's and Walter's cases. 60 They conducted inter-
views and collected information on the LaGrands' background and childhood
community.161 Germanybecame litigiouslyinvolved, however, after the execution
of Karl LaGrand.1'62 The consulate representatives continued to visit Walter in
prison and monitored his case.16 The German ambassador to the United States
made a presentation to the clemency board, at which he argued the importance
of consular assistance and provided information about Walter's background. He
also asked for a reprieve or, at the least, an opportunityto litigate the I.CJ. order
to halt Walter's execution, pending its final decision." Germany then brought
suit in the United States Supreme Court to enforce the I.CJ. order in state
court.
165 Although the suit brought in the Supreme Court was unfruitful, Ger-
many's officials were so involved in the case of Walter LaGrand that Germany
filed a Memorial with the I.CJ. and, eventually, received a favorable ruling."
Despite the apparently adverse case law for a foreign national claiming a
violation of her Vienna Convention rights, there does seem to be a glimmer of
hope. Geraldo Valdez, a convicted murderer,"67 may benefit from the I.CJ.
decision in LaGnimi'" On September 10, 2001, the Oklahoma Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals granted an indefinite stay of execution and ordered the Attorney
General to respond to Valdez's application for post-conviction relief.169 The
appeals court order came after Governor Frank Keating's 30-day stay granted in
August.7 The court also granted permission to the Mexican government to file
a brief in the latest appeal.17' Mexico has claimed that Oklahoma violated the
160. Telephone interview with Dale Baich, Attorney, Federal Public Defender for the District





165. Se FederalRepublic of Germanyv. United States, 526 US. Ill (1999); siesqmz PartII.
166. Seegeo4yLaGrand Case (FR.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1 (une 27); sees"m Part H.
167. SeValdezv. State, 900 P.2d 363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Valdezv. Oklahoma, 516 US.
%7 (1995), wt dmaiA Valdez v. State, 933 P.2d 931 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), fdriai; Valdez
v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222 (10th COr. 2000), hAuah d Valdez v. Gibson, 121 S. CO. 1618 (2001),03t
168. SegmmU/ LaGrand Case (FR.G. v. US.), 2001 I.CJ. 1 (June 27); seesqm Part H1.
169. John Greiner, MeciamNadtrnldGIraa IwStayofExa, THE DAILYOKLAHO-





Vienna Convention by failing to notify Valdez of his right to consular
assistance. " Valdez's counsel is requesting a new trial based, on the I.CJ.'s
decision in LaGnrar i "3
The basis of the stayand subsequent appeal is an affidavit from psychiatrist
Cecil Mynatt, who previouslytestified that Valdez was competent to stand triaL74
Dr. Mynatt has recanted his prior statements.'"" After Valdez's counsel made
neuropsychological information available to him, Dr. Mynatt now concludes that
Valdez suffered from brain damage, paranoia, and "homosexual panic" at the
time of the murder and was, therefore, temporarily insane.7 6 The task for the
next appeal is establishing the prejudice that resulted from Dr. Mynatt's previ-
ously uninformed opinion.
Mexican officials, including President Vicente Fox, have been involved in
the later stages of this case." The medical and neurological information gathered
by the Mexican government revealed that Valdez's brain damage was the result
of injuries he suffered as a youth in Mexico." The most serious injury involved
a four-wheel-drive vehicle accident that required Valdez to be hospitalized. "
Valdez's family indicated that, after the accident, his behavior was "forever
altered." "s° The appeal stated that,
[H]ad Mexico been involved at the outset, the jury would have heard
from the state's own expert, [Mynatt] that Valdez suffered from a
number of serious head injuries that had left him with severe damage
to that portion of the brain that allows a normal adult to foresee and
consider the consequences of his actions. 8
As the petition alleges, consular assistance to Valdez could have resulted in a
vastly different verdict.
An alien prisoner currendyin the process of petitioning for habeas relief is
also receiving assistance fromthe foreign citizen's native country. Mario Bustillo,
a Honduran, was convicted of first-degree nurder in Fairfax County, Virginia.18 2
172. Id
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Bustillo was never informed of his Vienna Convention rights.'83 Bustillo's
motion to set aside the verdict was denied,184 and he was sentenced to thirty
years in prison.' Following the notice of appeal, the Honduran Consulate
confirmed it had not timely learned of the charges against its citizen."' At his
appeal, Bustillo argued that the verdict was based upon insufficient evidence and
illegally obtained evidence.'87 Additionally, he appealed the denial of the motion
to set aside the verdict on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The newly
discovered evidence included three eyewitnesses who observed a third party
commit the murder, admitted perjury by two Commonwealth witnesses, two
witnesses'impermissible contact with a juror, five separate Bradyviolations, and
a hearsay rendition of a confession byJulio "Sirena,"' 88 the third party accused
by the new eyewitness.'89
The Court of Appeals of Virginia limited its review to whether the trial
court erred in failing to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered
evidence."9  Applying the standard new-trial rules,"" the Court of Appeals
affirmed Bustillo's conviction.'92
The defense continued to amass evidence.' Another potential witness told
police that Sirena was the killer, and, shortly thereafter, the witness was
deported. 9' Sirena was surreptitiously captured on videotape in Honduras
boasting of the murder.' 5
Perhaps most important, the defense learned that Sirena had fled to Hondu-
ras shortly after the murder.'9 Once it learned of Bustillo's case after trial, the
Honduran consulate was able to locate Sirena's application for a national identifi-
cation card, which included a full facial photograph. The Honduran consulate
183. Telephone interviewwithJohnKiynaga, Partner, Kiyonaga &Kiyonaga (Sept. 25,2001).
184. Bwatio, 2000 WL 365930, at *1.
185. Telephone interviewwithJohnKiyonaga, Parmer, Kiyonaga &Kiyonaga (Sept. 25,2001).
186. Id.
187. Buill., 2000 WL 365930, at *1.
188. Telephone interviewwithJohnKiyonaga, Parmer, Kiyonaga &Kiyonaga (Sept. 25,2001).
"Sirena" is an alias. Id
189. BMtilo, 2000 WL 365930, at *1.
190. Id
191. See Odum v. Commonwealth, 301 SXE.2d 145, 149 (Va. 1983). To obtain a new trial, a
defendant must show that "the evidence (1) was discovered after trial, (2) could not have been
secured for trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) is not merely cumulative, corroborative or
collateral, and (4) is material and lilselyto produce a different result at another trial." Id
192. Buiak 2000 WL 365930, at *3.
193. Telephone interviewwichJohnKiyonaga, Partner, Kinaga &Kiyonaga (Sept. 25, 2001).






provided the photograph to Bustillo's post-trial defense counseL' 9 Given the
inconsistencies in identifying Bustillo as the killer, the photograph could have
made a dramatic difference in confronting witnesses at trial.
The Rui Apd 98 case is particularly unfortunate, because, although the
German consulate was aware of the case and had contact with Apek's attorney
at the time of trial in 1991, Apek's trial counsel did not ask for assistance.'"' Rudi
and his brother Michael were arrested for the murder of Michael's new wife."
The Apelt brothers had been in the United States for approximatelythree to four
months."' The German consulate was notified within days of their arrest, but
neither Rudi nor Michael was immediately told of his consular rights. 2 Later,
the German consul visited both brothers in jail and inquired into their cases."'
Trial defense counsel did not seek assistance but, instead, filed a motion with the
court to authorize travel expenditures for a trip to Germany to investigate
possible mitigation.2' The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that less
costly alternatives could produce the same information.05 The court denied the
motion." Both Rudi and Michael were convicted of premeditated first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and received death
197. Id According to Kiyonaga, the consulate stated that, had she known of Bustillo's arrest
and trial and of Sirena's apparent guilt, she would have done anything to help, including finding and
questioning Sirena in Honduras. ld
198. 861 P2d 654 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
199. Telephone interviewwith Dale Baich, Attorney, Federal Public Defender for the District
of Arizona (Oct. 26,2001). Se State v. (Ruch) Apelt, 861 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1993).
200. (Ridi Apiek 861 P.2d at 656 (referencing the facts in State v. (M.hael) Apek, 861 P.2d
634 (Ariz. 1993)). fichael and his wife Gndywere married on October 28,1988, and he purchased
two life insurance policies on her behalf, with a total coverage of $400,000. (Midad) Ap, 861 P2d
at 639. Qndy was murdered on December 23, 1988. Id at 639-40.
201. Telephone interview with Dale Baich, Attorney, Federal Public Defender for the District
of Arizona (Oct. 26,2001).
202. Id
203. Id
204. (Rud) Apd4 861 P2d at 659-60. The motion did not include a description of specific
mitigation evidence for which they were looking, but simply stated, "Rudi Apek was born and
raised in Germanyand came to this countryin September, 1988. HIs mother and other immediatefamily currentlyreside in Dusseldorf, Germany. Furthermore, other acquaintances, employers, and
personal friends reside in Germany." la The trial court denied the motion, and defense counsel
filed a motion for reconsideration, which did detail possible evidence of psy~hiatric records, famil
background, and mitigting witnesses available in Germany. Id at 660. The trial court, again,
denied the motion Id
205. Id at 660.
206. Id On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona found no abuse of discretion in
denying the motion, because defense counsel failed to explain why they needed to travel to
Germanyto obtain the necessary evidence. Id They, therefore, failed to show "need," as required
by due process and statute. Id
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sentences.207 The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed Rudi's and Michael's
convictions.
208
The German consulate is actively assisting Rudi and dosely monitoring his
habeas petition.2 9 Representatives from the consulate visit both Rudi and
Michael four to six times a year.2 10 The consul has provided psychiatric and
medical records from Germany, which indicate that Rudiis mentallyretarded and
show evidence of organic brain damage.211 The consulate's aid in uncovering the
medical records was especiallyhelpful, because records systems in foreign states
are often difficult to navigate, especially when the information is in another
language.
212
Bustillo's and Apek's cases, like Valdez, are perfect examples of prejudice
resulting from a lack of consular assistance. But for Dr. Mynatt's determination
at trial that Valdez was both competent and sane, which was based on incomplete
information, Valdez would not likely have been sentenced to death. The evi-
dence of brain damage and profound psychological problems stemming from
Valdez's childhood in Mexico, which were provided only after the Mexican
government became involved, show that his trial was substantially lacking in
pertinent information. But for the evidentiary problems and inability to locate
and identifySirena pre-trial, Bustillo mayhave been acquitted. With the Hondu-
ran consulate's assistance, Bustillo now has information about Sirena that will
support his claim of actual innocence. But for the lack of mitigating evidence
relating to his previous psychological problems and suggested mental retardation,
Rudi Apelt might have been spared from the death penalty The psychiatric and
psychological records and evalation collected bythe German consulate ilhmi-
nate Rudi's history and psychological make-up, especially with regard to his
relationship with MichaeL Because Rudi's defense was, in part, that he partici-
pated in the murder because of his brother's control over him, and because the
court found the evidence sufficient to prove that Rudi and Michael formed an
agreement to kill Michae's wife,213 the relationship between Rudi and Mchael
was pivotal to the jury's understanding of Rudi's culpability and the judge's
consideration of mitigation.214 But for the lack of mitigation evidence, later
207. Id at 656; waso (Mia AIt, 861 P.d at 642.
208. (RuS4)Aj, 861 P.2d at 663;se &o(MiduAp 861 P.2d at 654.
209. Telephone interviewvwithDale Baich, Attorney, Federal Public Defender for the District
of Arizona (Oct. 26,2001).
210. Id
211. Id Medical records indicate that Rudi's father hit his mother in the stomach with a steel
bar when Rudi was in the womb. Id
212. Id
213. (Ruwh) Apdt, 861 P.2d at 659.
214. Judges, rather than juries, decide the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors in
Arizona. Se emrn ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-703 (West 2000); seasoWalton v. Arizona, 497
US. 639,649 (1990) (holding that the Arizona capital punishmnat scheme is not unconstitutional
because judges make findings as to aggravation and mitigation).
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provided by Germany, Karl and Walter LaGrand may not have received a death
sentence. Again, evidence of childhood abuse would have served as mitigation.
Each trial suffered from a lack of evidence that may have been revealed
before trial had each defendant been advised of his rights pursuant to the Vienna
Convention. The states' violation of those rights jeopardized the reliabilityof the
verdicts in Valdez's, Bustillo's, Apel's, and the LaGrands' trials. If the appellate
and habeas counsel in the Valdez, Bmdso, and Apdt cases can prove that failure
to advise the defendants of their consular assistance rights led to their inability
to access important information and that the lack of that information prejudiced
their trials, they will overcome the procedural default obstacle that has been, to
this point, impossible to scale.
IX. Caiwribn
For myriad reasons, unrelated to competency, a defense attomeyrepresent-
ing a foreign national maybe ill-equipped to trythe case without assistance. For
myriad reasons, a foreign national defendant maybe ill-equipped to assist in her
own defense. Consular participation is crucial in these cases, as the Valdez,
Bwak14 and Apdt cases illustrate. Consulates can provide assistance with lan-
guage and communication problems, information about the native culture,
medical and psychological evidence from when the defendant resided in her
home country, political pressure, a 'familiar face" with whom the defendant feels
more at ease than with her American attorney, and extra legal resources. It is for
such basic reasons as these that the Vienna Convention provides for a defen-
dant's individual right to contact with her consulate. Failing to have such access
could, and apparently has, doomed some foreign national defendants.
The cases decided in the Supreme Court provide little, if any, room for
reversible error. The June 2001 opinion of the I.CJ. in LaGrani may, however,
prove somewhat effective. American courts traditionally resist international
pressure, but the appeals court decision in Valdez evidences a possible change in
how courts in the United States treat foreign nationals. I urge the defense bar -
don't hold your breath. The key to handling these cases is ask early, ask every
defendant. If defense counsel finds out in her initial interview with the client that
he is a foreign national, and he has not been informed of his Convention rights,
she should raise the issue immediately in a pre-trial motion to the court to
preserve the issue and guard against procedural default. She should also contact
the consulate and request assistance with investigation; translation; cultural
information; documentation in the form of medical, educational, psychological,
and other records; contact information for potential witnesses; and anypossiblemitigation evidence available in the foreign national's home country. She should
also encourage consulate representatives to monitor the case and visit with the
foreign defendant, so that she will foster a relationship between the consulate and
the defendant, thereby providing him with a "friendly face" who can speak his
language and explain the American legal system in terms he can understand. A
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"friendly face" may also promote a more amiable relationship between herself
and the defendant. A good relationship between the attorney and her client will
increase the likelihood of his full disclosure and meaningful assistance in his own
defense and, therefore, improve her ability to represent him.
Remedy is still a problem American courts have decided that the
exclusionaryrule does not apply, and granting newtrials is not onlydiscretionary
but also not prescribed in the Convention. The ICJ. has, however meekly,
suggested that American appellate courts review Convention violation cases for
fairness and consider a new trial as a remedy. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals
is considering that remedy, which is encouraging but not conclusive. While the
court in Star did provide for the possibility of awarding civil damages for a
Convention violation and did not absolutely foreclose the possibility of criminal
remedy, its language does suggest that obtaining a criminal remedy would be
difficult. A defense counsel's best option is to make use of the consulate at the
trial level for both legal and practical reasons.
